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COMMENTS
STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES: AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH?
INTRODUCTION
Traditional methods of acquiring control of a corpora-
tion-mergers and proxy fights-have been supplemented to a
large degree by the tender offer.' This transition occurred dur-
ing the favorable economic2 and legal3 environment of the
1 1979 by Alan B. Ford.
1. The literature on tender offers, particularly on the Williams Act, is vast. See
E. ARANow & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (1973) [hereinafter
cited as ARnow & EINHORN]; Branson, Some Suggestions From a Comparison of
British and American Tender Offer Regulation, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 685 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Branson]; Bromberg, Tender Offers: Safeguards and Re-
straints-An Interest Analysis, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 613 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Bromberg]; Brown, The Scope of the Williams Act and Its 1970 Amendments, 26
Bus. LAw. 1637 (1971); Cohen, A Note on Takeover Bids and Corporate Purchases of
Stock, 22 Bus. LAw. 149 (1966); Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisitions by
Tender Offers, 115 U. PA. L. Rav. 317 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Fleischer & Mun-
dheim]; Hamilton, Some Reflections on Cash Tender Offers Legislation, 15 N.Y.L.F.
269 (1969); Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, 45 HAav. Bus. REv.,
March, 1967, at 135 [hereinafter cited as Hayes & Taussig]; Henry, Activities of
Arbitrageurs In Tender Offers, 119 U. PA. L. R.v. 466 (1971); Langevoort, State
Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects, and Political Competency, 62 CORNELL L.
REv. 213 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Langevoort]; O'Hanlon, Goodrich's Four-Ply
Defense, FORTUNE, July, 1969, at 110; Schmults & Kelly, Cash Take-over
Bids-Defensive Tactics, 23 Bus. LAw. 115 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Schmults &
Kelly]; Shipman, Some Thoughts About the Role of State Takeover Legislation: The
Ohio Takeover Act, 21 CASE W. REs. L. RIv. 722 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Ship-
man]; Sommer, The Ohio Takeover Act: What Is It?, 21 CASE W. Ras. L. REv. 681
(1970); Note, Cash Tender Offers, 83 HAsv. L. REv. 377 (1966); Note, Judicial Control
of Cash Tender Offers-A Few Practical Recommendations, 50 IND. L.J. 114 (1974);
Note, The Courts and the Williams Act: Try a Little Tenderness, 48 N.Y.U. L. Rav.
991 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Try a Little Tenderness]; Note, Commerce Clause
Limitation Upon State Regulation of Tender Offers, 47 So. CAL. L. REV. 1133 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Commerce Clause].
2. The prospering economy, the decreasing number of willing merger partners,
and the ease and low cost of cash tender offers relative to other methods of acquisition
increased the number of tender offers drastically. See Hayes & Taussig, supra note 1,
at 136-37. Other reasons for the rapid growth of the use of the tender offer have been
suggested in ARANOw & EINHORN, supra note 1, at 65-66. They include: increased
corporate liquidity and readily available credit; comparatively depressed price-
earnings ratios, book values, and assets ratios of targets; greater recognition and ac-
ceptance of the technique; greater flexibility than other methods of acquisition; and
the psychological appeal to shareholders who can receive straight cash for their shares.
3. For discussion of securities law as applied to tender offers before the passage
of the Williams Act, see Bromberg, The Securities Law of Tender Offers, 15 N.Y.L.F.
462, 531 (1969); Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 1, at 317.
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1960's in which the tender offer experienced phenomenal
growth as a tool of companies seeking diversification of profita-
ble investments.' In 1968, Congress responded to this relatively
new method5 of acquiring control of a corporation by passing
the Williams Act,' which requires a minimum level of disclo-
sure and prohibits fraudulent acts in connection with tender
offers. The purpose of the Williams Act is to provide full and
fair disclosure for the benefit of the shareholders while at the
same time providing a regulatory balance between the offeror
and the target company
Despite the clear intention of Congress to balance the var-
ious competing interests, thirty-six states8 have passed legisla-
tion imposing more restrictions on tender offers and, in some
respects, directly upsetting the balance established by the Wil-
liams Act. This trend has caused concern for the continuing
existence of the tender offer as a viable tool for an insurgent
corporation to acquire control of a target corporation. One com-
mentator, in criticizing the Ohio act, stated:
The real impact of the law, in my opinion, will be felt not
so much in its application as in its hovering omnipresence.
I suspect, so far as Ohio and Ohio-based corporations are
concerned, the corporate takeover as a form of corporate
warfare is a thing of the past.'
Although called "investor-protection" statutes by their spon-
sors, the state statutes have been criticized as little more than
"parochial [attempts] to protect incumbent mangement and
local industry"'" by making completion of a successful tender
4. In 1960 there were only 8 cash tender offers involving companies with securi-
ties listed on national securities exchanges as compared to 107 in 1966. ARANow &
EINHORN, supra note 1, at 65 n.3.
5. For a comparative analysis of the English and American approach to tender
offer regulation, see Branson, supra note 1, at 685.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976).
7. 113 CONG. REc. 854-55 (1967) (remarks of Senator Williams).
8. For a complete list of state takeover statutes, see Langevoort, supra note 1,
at 214 n.10 (1977); Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and
Their Constitutionality, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 3 n.17 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Tender Trap]; Comment, The Constitutionality of State Takeover Statutes: A Re-
sponse to Great Western, 53 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 872 (1978).
9. Vorys, Ohio Tender Offer Bill, 43 OHfo BAR 65, 73 (1970) (emphasis added).
10. ARANow & EINHORN, supra note 1, at 172. Sommer, discussing the Ohio
statute, states:
The Ohio Act is perhaps unique in that its provisions create a strong
impression that its purpose is not to improve disclosure in connection
with tender offers, but rather to create a scheme of disclosure that will
strongly inhibit, if not render impossible, the making of tender offers with
respect to corporations which have the requisite relationship to Ohio, not
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offer a near impossibility.
In this comment, the author will initially present the me-
chanics involved in tender offers. Second, the substantive pro-
visions and legislative history of the Williams Act will be dis-
cussed. Third, the provisions of the various state takeover stat-
utes will be analyzed, demonstrating their broad implications
and inherent difficulties with the concurrent regulation by fed-
eral authorities. Finally, after a consideration of the interstate
commerce and preemption implications, the author concludes
that the state takeover statutes are unconstitutional.
TENDER OFFERS
Essentially, a cash tender offer is a public invitation to the
shareholders of the target corporation to tender their shares to
the aggressor corporation for purchase at a specified price,
usually fifteen to twenty percent in excess of the current mar-
ket price." The tender offer is occasionally preceded or accom-
panied by substantial open market purchases of the target cor-
poration's shares."2 The offer is usually supplementary to direct
negotiations for a consensual merger. However, if negotiations
break down, a cash offer may immediately follow.
In planning a tender offer, a potential buyer will seek out
a target corporation-usually a company with a poor operating
record relative to the rest of the industry or a company under-
valued by the market. 3 The offeror must then analyze the
amount of shares needed to gain working control of the target
corporation." When a cash tender offer is made, the open mar-
only in Ohio but everywhere else as well. While purporting to protect
shareholders, there is reason to believe that its provisions were really
designed to place the management of companies within its gambit be-
yond the pale of unfriendly attack. The history of the legislation and the
timing of its introduction confirm this suspicion. Fortune magazine, in
detailing the successful defense of B.F. Goodrich Co. against the takeover
attempt of Northwest Industries, Inc., has said: "Meanwhile, members
of the Ohio Manufacturers Association, including a Goodrich representa-
tive were meeting in Cleveland to draft state legislation that would block
or delay tender offers."
Sommer, The Ohio Takeover Act: What Is It?, 21 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 681,682 (1970).
11. For the factors that go into the determination of the amount of the premium,
see Hayes & Taussig, supra note 1, at 140-42.
12. See ARA~ow & EINHORN, supra note 1, at 19-29.
13. For analyses of the characteristics of potential targets, compare ARANow &
EINHORN, supra note 1, at 1-9, with Hayes & Taussig, supra note 1, at 142. Hayes &
Taussig emphasize poor operating performance as the most important characteristic
of a target, while Aranow & Einhorn emphasize market undervaluation in the form of
a low price-earnings ratio.
14. Working control can usually be achieved by obtaining 20% to 30% of the
1979]
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ket price of the shares usually increases dramatically. 5
Whether it equals or exceeds the tender offer price depends on
a variety of factors, including the probability that a competing
offer at a higher price might be made."6 Shareholders have the
choice of selling their shares in the open market, retaining
them, or tendering their shares. Most shares sold on the open
market are ultimately tendered. A group of speculators, known
as arbitragers," purchase shares in the open market at prices
below the tender offer price in order to tender them and profit
by the difference between the two prices. In some tender offers,
the volume of transactions effected by arbitragers appears to
have been very substantial."
Typically, the offer is open for two to three weeks, during
which time tendered shares are held by a depository bank."9
When the tendering period has expired, the offeror will pur-
chase the shares through the depository, who will pay the
shareholders for the tendered shares, return extra shares, and
turn over the stock to the offeror10
The tender offer situation may create conflicting goals on
the part of the various parties involved and competing public
policy judgments concerning the nature and role of the tender
offer itself.2' The offeror has a direct economic interest in the
tender offer. In addition to the consideration it must pay, there
outstanding shares. See Bromberg, supra note 1, at 620.
15. Bills Providing for Full Disclosure of Corporate Entity Ownership of Securi-
ties Under the Security Exchange Act of 1934: Hearings on H.R. 14475 & S. 510 Before
the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1968) (remarks of Donald L. Calvin, Vice Presi-
dent of the New York Stock Exchange).
16. On Thursday, October 11, 1973, Texas Gulf stock traded above the tender
offer price of $29, and many shareholders sought to withdraw the shares they had
already tendered. See Texas Gulf, Inc. v. Canada Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374
(S.D.Tex. 1973); Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 1973, at 8, col. 2.
17. Arbitrage is the practice whereby broker-dealers purchase shares subject to
a tender offer at the open market price, in the hope of tendering them at the higher
offer price. See ARANOW & EINHORN, supra note 1, at 173-91. It has been estimated that
over 50% of all tenders in cash tender offers come from arbitragers. Id. at 173 n.2.
18. Id. at 173 n.2.
19. Shares are tendered to the depository or to its forwarding agent. See id. at
59.
20. Since the offeror wishes to purchase a definite number of shares, it usually
reserves the right to refuse to purchase any shares if less than the number required to
secure control are tendered. Further, if more than the desired number are tendered,
he must take the desired number on a pro rata basis from each shareholder. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1976).
21. For a detailed study of the various interests involved, see Bromberg, supra
note 1.
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are substantial costs,22 an economic stake in the profit of the
acquired company, and the need for protection if the offer fails.
The management of the target corporation must represent the
interests of the shareholders,s the interests of the corporation
as an economic entity,' and all too frequently, their own inter-
est in retaining personal power and control.2s Furthermore,
management may retain control through the use of various
defense tactics .2  These may include driving up the market
price of the target's shares so that the offer will appear unat-
tractive,2 7 diluting the aggressor's position by issuing addi-
tional treasury shares or previously unissued shares and plac-
ing them firmly in friendly hands,2s finding a more congenial
suitor, or litigating the matter.2 ' The target shareholders must
decide whether to tender or to sell his or her shares on the open
market, often with only the information presented in bits and
pieces by both sides."
22. These costs include the fees and commissions for the dealer-manager, deposi-
tory bank, and soliciting dealers. Further, if litigation ensues, counsel fees are another
cost. See ARMiow & EINHORN, supra note 1, at 10-11.
23. See Bromberg, supra note 1, at 658.
24. Id. at 641.
25. Id. at 656-57.
26. A complete discussion of defense tactics may be found in Schmults & Kelly,
Cash Take Over Bids-Defensive Tactics, 23 Bus. LAw. 115 (1967). See also ArNow
& EINHORN, supra note 1, at 219-76; Hayes & Taussig, supra note 1, at 142-47. A few
of the tactics are as follows:
(1) repurchase its own securities, to make it less likely for the tender
offeror to obtain control of the company, ARANow & EINHORN, supra note
1, at 235;
(2) induce friendly third parties to make open market purchases of the
company's securities, id. at 242-43;
(4) announce dividend increases, or stock splits, id. at 245-47;
(5) take steps to create an incompatibility between the target company
and the tender offeror, for example, in inducing possible anti-trust viola-
tions should the tender offer be successful, id. at 254-56;
(6) seek to arrange a defensive merger, id. at 256-58;
(7) enter into restrictive loan agreements, with default to occur should the
tender offer succeed, id. at 274-76; and
(8) institute litigation, challenging either directly or collaterally, the con-
duct or effect of the tender offer, id. at 266-68.
27. ARAiow & EINHORN, supra note 1, at 242-43.
28. Id. at 247-49.
29. Id. at 256-58, 266-68.
30. See Bromberg, supra note 1, at 658-59.
31. He must remember that even if he tenders his shares, some shares may be
returned if the offeror receives more stock that it desires to purchase. Thus, even
though he has decided to sell, a tendering shareholder may still find himself an invol-
untary investor in the target, now a subsidiary company. In fact, after a particularly
attractive offer, so many shares may be returned, and the market price may fall so low,
that the value of the shareholder's returned shares plus the payment received from the
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Overlying these various competing private interests are
the social needs of providing an effective means of transfer-
ring control,32 while simultaneously protecting the investor."
These concerns gave rise to the federal regulatory framework
known as the Williams Act 4 in which Congress attempted to
accommodate the various interests and policies and to achieve
a balance of protection for all involved in a tender offer.
FEDERAL LEGISLATION AND REGULATION
Legislative Background
Before the adoption of the Williams Act, there was little
control over tender offers. Federal regulation was limited to
those few offers subject to the disclosure requirements of the
Securities Act of 1933.11 State regulation was limited to the
common law restrictions of the corporate asset theory,3 unrea-
sonable interference with economic relationships, 37 libel, and
fraud. As a result of this regulatory vacuum, a number of
offeror is less than the value of his pre-offer holdings. This was a possibility in the
tender offer made by Trafalgar House Inv. Ltd. for Dearborn-Storm Corp., N.Y.
Times, Aug. 8, 1973, at 53, col. 5.
32. As long as the concentration of economic power is not excessive, society has
an interest in permitting and perhaps promoting corporate acquisition. Tender offers
may present opportunities for improved corporate performance through more aggres-
sive and imaginative management. Further, certain mergers can promote economic
growth by introducing economies of scale and by combining complementary business
units. Also, replacement of complacent or inefficient management promotes manage-
ment accountability to shareholders and removes the insulation between shareholders
and management. The mere threat of takeover performs a valuable function, and thus,
the societal interest in promoting corporate accountability is served by the availability
of practicable methods of corporate acquisition such as the tender offer.
33. Investor protection as expressed in federal statutes regulating the securities
market has two dimensions: first, investors must have information about the enterprise
in order to make an intelligent decision, and second, investors must be protected from
victimization by persons who control securities markets or who are privy to important
information by virtue of "insider" position. These concerns gave rise to the federal
regulatory program instituted in the 1930's. See 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 121-
31 (2d ed. 1961).
34. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976).
35. See S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1967); H.R. REP. No. 1711,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1968); see also Bromberg, The Securities Law of Tender Offers
Legislation, 15 N.Y.L.F. 269, 273-74 (1969); Note, Cash Tender Offers, 83 HARv. L.
REv. 377, 379 (1969); Note, The Developing Meaning of Tender Offers Under the
Securities Act of 1934, 86 HAav. L. REV. 1250, 1254 (1973).
36. See Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1956); Leech,
Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U..PA. L. REV. 725 (1956); Hill, The Sale of
Controlling Shares, 70 HAav. L. REV. 986 (1957).
37. Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 1, at 321; see also Peffer v. Bennett, 523




The secrecy with which the process was enshrouded pro-
duced additional problems. Senator Kuchel, a co-sponsor of
the Williams Act, lamented the futile position of both manage-
ment and shareholders stating that both were caught in
the "tragedy" of the "rape" of the target corporation by corpo-
rate raiders acting under a "cloak of secrecy."3 This problem
was compounded by the combatants' dissemination of "a rash
of charges and counter charges,"3 neither subject to existing
disclosure requirements nor susceptible to control under exist-
ing antifraud provisions. 0 Referring specifically to abuses by
management in opposing a tender offer, SEC Commissioner
Cohen emphasized:
If management does oppose the offer, the present lack of
regulation leaves it with powerful weapons which it may
wield with impunity, provided its activities fall short of
fraud. Management tactics may include making all sorts
of predictions and extravagent claims .... ,
Another abuse involved the "undue pressure on sharehold-
ers to act hastily and to accept before management or any other
group has an opportunity to present opposing arguments or
competing offers."' 2 Offers were announced under conditions
creating the impression that a hasty deposit was required to
participate in a transaction structured on a first come, first
served basis. 3 Those who succumbed were deprived of taking
advantage of later and better offers.
Finally, offerors and target managements and their allies
were found to have engaged in manipulative and deceptive
practices as an integral part of their offensive and defensive
strategies."
Seeking to remedy the abuses, Senator Harrison Williams
of New Jersey proposed federal regulation of cash tender offers.
Initially, the purpose was to protect incumbent management
from "industrial sabotage" resulting from what were deemed
38. Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover
Bids: Senate Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate
Comm. on Banking & Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 203 (1967).
39. Id. at 19, 35.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 196.
42. Id. at 21, 35.
43. Id. at 17.
44. Fleisher & Mundheim, supra note 1, at 321.
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to be reckless corporate raids "on proud old companies."' 5
Throughout the hearings, however, it became evident that
tender offers might in some cases promote the best interests of
society by providing an effective method of removing ineffi-
cient, unimaginative and entrenched management." Thus, the
focus of the legislation changed from one of protecting incum-
bent management to one of providing "full and fair disclosure
for the benefit of stockholders while at the same time providing
the offeror and management equal opportunity to fairly present
their case."'" The final version became law on July 29, 1968."1
The Congressional intent was clear-neither the incumbent
nor the insurgent were to enjoy any advantage over the other.
Senator Williams expressed this position, stating:
I have taken extreme care with this legislation to balance
the scales equally to protect the legitimate interests of the
corporation, management, and shareholders without un-
duly impeding cash takeover bids. Every effort has been
made to avoid tipping the balance of regulatory burdens
in favor of management or in favor of the offeror. 9
45. 111 CONG. Rac. 28257-60 (Oct. 22, 1965) (remarks of Senator Williams on S.
2731). Senator Harrison Williams analyzed the problem in this way when he intro-
duced S. 2731 in the Senate:
In recent years we have seen proud old companies reduced to corpo-
rate shells after white collar pirates have seized control with funds from
sources which are unknown in many cases, then sold or traded away the
best assets, later to split up most of the loot among themselves ...
The ultimate responsibility for preventing this kind of industrial
sabotage lies with the management and shareholders of the corporation
that is so threatened. But the leniency of our laws place management and
shareholders at a distinct disadvantage in coming to grips with the
enemy.
Id.
46. 113 CoNG. RFc. 857-58 (Jan. 18, 1967) (remarks of Senator Kuchel on S. 510).
See also 113 CONG. REc. 24662-66 (Aug. 30, 1967).
47. 113 CONG. REc. 854-55 (Jan. 18, 1967) (remarks of Senator Williams).
48. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976)). For legislative history, see Full Disclosure of Cor-
porate Equity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover Bids: Senate Hearings on S. 510
Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking & Currency, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 15, 175, 244 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]; H.R. Rm.
No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1968).
49. 113 CoNG. REc. 854-55 (1967) (remarks of Senator Williams); see Rondeau v.
Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1975). See also Electronic Specialty Co. v.
International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 948 (2d Cir. 1969), where the court stated:
Congress intended to assure basic honesty and fair dealing, not to impose
an unrealistic requirement of laboratory conditions that might make the
new statute a potent tool for incumbent management to protect its own
interests against the desires and welfare of the stockholders.
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Major Provisions of the Williams Act
The Williams Act50 in 1968 added sections 13(d) and (e)
and 14(d), (e) and (f) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
As amended in 1970,11 the act regulates tender offers in five
areas: 1) disclosure in connection with certain stock acquisi-
tions; 2) regulation of corporate purchases of its own stock; 3)
regulation of tender offers; 4) fraud in connection with tender
offers; and 5) reporting changes in majority of directors.
Disclosure in connection with certain stock acquisitions:
section 13(d). Any person,5" acquiring directly or indirectly
beneficial ownership53 of an equity security," registered pur-
suant to section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 193411
50. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, amending 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m-78n (1964) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976)). For a
succinct and thorough analysis of the Williams Act and its 1970 amendments, see
Brown, The Scope of the Williams Act and Its 1970 Amendments, 28 Bus. LAW. 1637
(1971).
51. Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976)). The amendments, designed for the benefit of the
public investor, provide for the following:
1) reduction of the percentage of stock ownership needed to trigger the disclosure
requirements of the Act from 10% to 5% in an effort to provide public disclosure at a
more meaningful level;
2) extension of the Act to cover exchange tender offers in order to provide investors
subject to such offers with the substantive protections of the Act;
3) extension of the Act to cover tender offers for insurance companies;
4) rule-making power for the SEC under the anti-fraud provision, of the Act to
enable it to deal more effectively with fraudulent practices; and
5) rule-making power for the SEC to create flexibility in regulation of persons in
a control relationship with the issuer.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(2) (1976) defines a person as: "When two or more persons
act as a partnership, limited partnership, syndicate, or other group for the purpose of
acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an issuer ..
53. The term beneficial owner as used by the Act parallels Rule 16a-2 by deeming
a person to be the beneficial owner of shares of common stock underlying presently
exercisable options, warrants or rights or convertible securities which are presently
convertible. However, a case dealing with this problem concluded that, for purposes
of the Williams Act, "in the context of a contest for control," any person who has the
right to determine how stock is to be voted has "beneficial ownership" of the stock for
purpose of Section 13(d). Bath Industries v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97, 112 (7th Cir. 1970).
54. The Act applies to any equity security: (1) of a class registered pursuant to
Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (including publicly-held over-the-
counter securities registered under Section 12(g) as well as securities listed on an
exchange); (2) of close-end investment companies registered under the Investment
Company Act; or (3) (as a result of the 1970 amendment) of insurance companies
which would have been required to be registered under Section 12(g) except for the
Section 12(g)(2)(G) exception.
55. The corporations that are covered by the Act are those with assets over one
million dollars and 500 shareholders, or those whose securities are traded on any
national exchange. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(g)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1976).
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in excess of five percent," must disclose certain information
within ten days.57 Section 13(d)(2) requires amendments to be
filed if any material changes occur in the facts set forth in the
statement as well as setting forth various exceptions.58
Regulation of corporate purchases of its own stock: section
13(e). The Securities Exchange Commission is given broad
rule-making authority with respect to repurchases of securities
by a corporation. Section 13(e) prohibits an issuer from pur-
chasing its own stock in contravention of rules adopted by the
SEC "to define acts and practices which are fraudulent; decep-
tive or manipulative" and "to prescribe means reasonably de-
signed to prevent such acts and devices."59 Under section
13(e)(2), a purchase by "any person controlling, controlled by
56. This percentage was reduced from 10% to 5%. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1976).
The proposal to reduce the threshold from 10% to 5% drew objections from various
groups, in that they might be forced to file burdensome reports even though their stock
purchases were not designed to influence control of the issuers. Additional Consumer
Protection in Corporate Takeovers and Increasing the Securities Act Exemptions for
Small Businessmen: Hearings on S. 336 and S. 3431 Before the Subcomm. on Securi-
ties of the Senate Comm. of Banking & Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 13, 108, 116
(1970). To meet these objections, the House added section 13(g)(5), a grant of power
to the SEC to permit a purchaser to file in lieu of a Schedule 13D, a short notice stating
the name of the purchaser, the number of shares owned by him, and such other
information as the SEC may require. See Investor Protection in Corporate Takeovers,
Increase in "Regulation A " Exemption: Hearings on H. R. 4285, S. 3431 & S. 336 Before
the Subcomm. on Commerce & Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign
Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 58-59 (1970).
57. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1978). Schedule 13D outlines the information to be
supplied to the SEC as follows:
1) identification of the security and issuer affected by the acquisition;
2) identity and background of the person filing the statement;
3) source and amount of funds to be employed for financing the acquisition;
4) the purpose of the transaction;
5) current rights or interest in the security or the issuer;
6) contracts, arrangements, or understandings with respect to the security;
7) persons employed or to be compensated for making solicitations or recommen-
dations for the offer; and
8) copies of all public invitations or advertisements.
For a general discussion of Schedule 13D, see Schmults & Kelly, Disclosure in
Connection with Cash Take-over Bids: The New Regulations, 24 Bus. LAW. 19 (1968);
Robinson & Mahoney, Schedule 13D: Wild Card in the Take-over Deck, 27 Bus. LAW.
1107 (1972).
58. An acquisition of stock does not need to be reported under Section 13(d) if
made by means of a registration statement under the Securities Act of 1933, §
13(d)(6)(A); or by the issuer of stock, § 13(d)(6)(C) (purchases by the issuer are regu-
lated under § 13(e)); or if stock acquired during the preceeding twelve months, does
not exceed 2% of the class, § 13(d)(6)(B). The SEC also has the power under §
13(d)(6)(D) to exempt any acquisition "not entered into for the purpose of, and not
having the effect of, changing or influencing the control of the issuer or otherwise . ..
not comprehended within the purpose of the subsection."
59. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e)(1) (1976).
STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES
or under common control with the issuer, or a purchase subject
to control of the issuer, or any such person, shall be deemed to
be a purchase by the issuer." 0 The 1970 amendments to the
Williams Act give added supervisory power to the SEC to
make rules and regulations implementing the rules regarding
persons other than the issuer.6 '
Regulation of tender offers: section 14(d). A person making
a tender offer," which would result in the offeror owning more
than five percent63 of the target company, must concurrently
file a 13(d) form with the SEC. In addition, no solicitation or
recommendation may be made to shareholders until a 14(d)
statement is filed with the SEC. Before that filing, the only
communication which a target company is allowed to send to
its shareholders with respect to the tender offer is that manage-
ment is studying the offer and requests that shareholders defer
their decision until they have heard from management. Section
14(d)(5) permits a depositor to withdraw his tendered shares
within the first seven days of the offer and after sixty days from
the making of the offer." Section 14(d)(6) requires that the
offeror accept pro-rata all shares deposited during the first ten
days of the offer.6" Section 14(d)(7) requires the offeror to pay
,to the depositors any increase in price occurring before the offer
expires." Section 14(8) addresses itself to various exceptions. 7
Anti-fraud provisions: section 14(e). No person may make
any untrue statement of a material fact or omission or act in
any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative manner in connec-
60. Id. § 13(e)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e)(2) (1976).
61. Id.
62. The Williams Act does not define tender offer. In August, 1976, the SEC
proposed new rules to implement the policies of the Williams Act. The Commissioner's
view is that a definition of tender offer is neither necessary nor appropriate. Security
Exchange Release No. 33004 (Aug. 6, 1976) (41 Fed. Reg. 33004 (1976)). For a general
discussion, see Note,' The Developing Meaning of Tender Offer Under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1250 (1973). Several commentators have
recognized the difficulties and uncertainty caused by the failure to define tender offer.
See Griffin & Tucker, The Williams Act, Public Law 90-439-Growing Pains? Some
Interpretations with Respect to the Williams Act, 16 How. L.J. 654, 699-703 (1971);
AtAow & EINHORN, supra note 1, at 69-76.
63. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
64. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(d)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1976).
65. Id. § 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1976). The purpose of this provision is
to prevent shareholders from being stampeded into acceptance of an offer on a first
come, first serve basis, giving the shareholder a time to assess the circumstances.
66. Id. § 14(d)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1976).
67. Id. § 14(d)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(8) (1976). Persons who purchase stock
during the preceding twelve months, not exceeding 2%; purchases by the issuer of such
security; and by rules proposed by the Commissioner are exempt from the require-
ments of section 14(d).
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tion with any tender offer." The 1970 amendment granted
power to the SEC to make rules to "define and prescribe means
reasonably designed to prevent such acts and practices as are
fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative.""9
Reporting changes in majority of directors: section 14(f).
Persons who acquire more than five percent of stock through a
tender offer subject to 14(d), or who otherwise plan to restruc-
ture the board of directors pursuant to an understanding, must
provide the same information required by a proxy statement
covering elections to all shareholders and the SEC at least ten
days before such persons take office."0
In general, the Williams Act reflects an explicit congres-
sional decision to resolve the problems involved in the making
of tender offers and in the tactics used in opposing them . The
scheme established standards for all participants, without tip-
ping the scales in favor either of incumbent management or in
favor of insurgent groups seeking to gain control of the target
company." In recent years, state legislatures have entered the
same arena. That involvement has created confusion in the
regulation of tender offers.
STATE LEGISLATION
State regulation of securities has generally followed the
68. Id. § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
69. Id.
70. Id. § 14(0, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(f) (1976).
71. In August, 1976, the SEC proposed new rules to implement the policies of
the Williams Act, 41 Fed. Reg. 33004 (1976). Among other things, the proposed rules
would give offerors increased access to target shareholders lists, permit offerors to
publish their offers in more summary form, require that offers be held open for at least
15 days, extend the amount of time that investors have to withdraw their shares from
7 to 10 days, and permit an offeror to accept shares tendered in a pro-rata basis
throughout the life of the offer.
72. Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18(a), as added by the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, §§ 201, 202, 90 Stat.
1383 (1976), requires persons contemplating certain direct or indirect mergers or ac-
quisitions (including cash tender offers) to give the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
advance notice and to wait 15 days before consummation of the offer. Unlike state
takeover statutes, the Antitrust Improvement Act imposes a rather minimal waiting
period requirement prior to the acquisition of securities, rather than prior to the comm-
encement of a tender offer. Thus, the effect of the Act is to require that offers be kept
open prior to any purchases for 15 days from the date of notification, since the Williams
Act effectively requires that most offers be kept open for at least 10 days regardless. §
14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1976). In the deliberation over the Antitrust Improve-
ment Act, the drafters expressed their desire to preserve the speed and secrecy element
of the Williams Act, while at the same time allowing for effective antitrust analysis.
See H.R. REP. No. 1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-13, reprinted in [19711 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. Naws 4119, 4125-27.
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philosophy of the Securities Act of 19337' and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934" by requiring issuers to make full disclo-
sure to investors and by regulating the activities of those per-
sons through whom securities are purchased and sold. In recent
years thirty-six states have attempted to provide additional
investor and issuer protection by adopting additional disclo-
sure requirements, pre-offer filing requirements, and review
procedures for tender offers.75 This proliferation of state legisla-
tion concerning takeovers may cause the premature death of
tender offers. Various aspects of the state statutes examined
below highlight the problem of integrating the state and federal
regulations into a workable solution.
Offers Subject to Regulation.
The jurisdictional basis of the various state takeover stat-
utes is uniformly broad. All states have required some combi-
nation of: 1) incorporation within the state, 2) location of the
principal place of business within the state, and/or 3) existence
of substantial assets within the state." All of the states' stat-
utes apply when the target company is incorporated within the
state. Hawaii77 and Virginia" limit their jurisdiction to corpora-
tions incorporated and doing business within the state.
Alaska,7' Kansas," and Ohio"' regulate tender offers of compa-
nies incorporated under the law of the state, having their prin-
cipal plate of business and a substantial portion of assets
within the state. Indiana, 2 Maryland," and South Dakota"
extend their jurisdiction to corporations incorporated within
73. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbb (1976).
74. Id. §§ 78a-78jj.
75. Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Ha-
waii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin. See note 8 and accom-
panying text supra.
76. The language varies from statute to statute. In some, it is in the disjunctive
and in others it is in the conjunctive. In Copperweld Corp. v. Societ6 Imetal, 75 Civ.
09-3836 (C.P. Franklin County, Ohio, Oct. 9, 1975), the Ohio statute, written in the
conjunctive, was interpreted by the Attorney General of Ohio to equate substantial
assets with the principal place of business.
77. HAW. REv. STAT. § 417E-1(5) (1976).
78. VA. CODE § 13.1-529(e) (1978).
79. ALASKA STAT. § 45.57.110(E)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
80. KAN. STAT. § 17-1276(a) (1974).
81. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(A)(1) (Page 1978).
82. IND. CODE § 23-2-3-1(j) (1976).
83. MD. CORP. & Ass'NS. CODE ANN. § 11-901(i) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
84. S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 47-32-3 (Supp. 1978).
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the state, having their principal place of business or substantial
assets within the state. Louisiana asserts jurisdiction over cor-
porations which have more than fifty percent of their employ-
ees within the state and aggregate assets of at least fifty million
dollars. 5
Many states have exempted what has commonly been
called the "friendly offer," 8 from the requirements of their
tender offer takeover statutes. A friendly offer is an offer to
acquire equity securities where the target company's board of
directors has furnished the terms to the shareholders and rec-
ommended acceptance of the offer. 7 Some states require that
at least two-thirds of the shareholders consent,88 and that the
offer be made to all shareholders on equal terms.8 Various
other exemptions may apply such as offers of corporations not
registered pursuant to the Securities Act of 1934,0 isolated of-
fers not made to stockholders generally,' repurchase offers,9"
certain registered exchange offers,9 3 ordinary brokers' transac-
tions,"4 offers declared exempt by state commissioners," ex-
change offers not within the meaning of section 4 of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933,"1 offers subject to approval by appropriate
federal agencies,97 and offers that would result in the acquisi-
tion of less than two percent of any class within the past twelve
months.'8
The broad jurisdictional basis and the various exemptions
disclose the intent of the states to focus on unfriendly tender
offers, thereby protecting local industry. This aggressive asser-
tion of legislative jurisdiction points to an inconsistency with
the professed purpose of the acts-investor protection. Tradi-
tionally, a local interest is sufficient under the broad rules jus-
85. LA. REV. STAT. § 51:1500(12) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
86. Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, and Nevada are the exceptions. See, e.g.,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-347a-347m (West Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
203 (Cum. Supp. 1977); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 417E-1-15 (1976); NEV. REV. STAT. §§
78.3776-.3778 (1973).
87. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(A)(1)(d) (Page 1978).
88. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-529(b)(v) (1978).
89. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 30-1501(5)(e) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
90. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51.5-102(5)(c) (Supp. 1976).
91. E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 417E-1(8)(a) (1978).
92. E.g., S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 47-32-2(6) (Supp. 1978).
93. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 30-1501(5)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
94. E.g., S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 47-32-2(1) (Supp. 1978).
95. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51.5-102(5)(e) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
96. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(A)(1)(b) (Page 1978).
97. E.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(H) (Page 1978).
98. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51.5-102(5)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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tifying extraterritorial jurisdiction." However, serious conflicts
arise when jurisdiction is extended, and the interests of other
states are affected.'"
Major Provisons of the State Statutes.
Disclosure requirements. All states require an offeror to
disclose certain information to the target company and most
states require disclosure to the state regulatory authorities as
well."' Some states follow the schedule 13(d) form of the Wil-
liams Act, 02 while others go far beyond that. 10 3 Pennsylvania,
for example, requires disclosure of the identity and background
of all persons involved in the offer, the sources and amount of
its funds, its plans for the future of the target company, the
number of target shares held by the offeror, and any contrac-
tual arrangements with respect to any equity security of the
target company. Pennsylvania further requires information on
the organization and operations of the offeror, including its
financial statements, principal properties, employee relations,
pending legal proceedings, and any other information that the
corporations commissioner may require to make a full and fair
disclosure.1'0 Although such additional disclosure may provide
more information to the shareholders, the information really
necessary to assess a tender offer is contained in the disclosure
requirements of the Williams Act.
Time requirements. Most state statutes require the filing
of the above information within a specified time period before
the public announcement of the offer. This may range from ten
days, as in Colorado,' to sixty days, as in Hawaii. 0 These
waiting periods were specifically rejected by Congress in formu-
lating the federal legislation and raise some problems in the
operation of the tender offer process.
The original version of the Williams Act would have re-
quired the offeror to inform the target company of its intentions
99. Kaplan, Foreign Corporations and Local Corporate Policy, 21 VAD. L. REv.
433, 444 (1968).
100. See Shipman, supra note 1, at 748-50.
101. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1604-1606 (McKinney Supp. 1978-79).
102. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1976).
103. 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (1976).
104. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 75 (Purdon Supp. 1978-79). This extensive disclo-
sure requirement is similar to other states. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1707.041(B)(3) (Page 1978); IND. CODE § 23-2-3-2(c) (1976).
105. COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51.5-104(1) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
106. HAW. REV. STAT. § 417E-3(f) (1976).
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to make an offer twenty days prior to the solicitation. T0 Con-
gress felt that such a proposal would tip the balance in favor
of the target company, thus permitting undue delays and possi-
ble failure of the offer.' 8 Accordingly, the final version of the
Williams Act provided disclosure to investors within a statu-
tory framework favoring neither the offeror nor management of
the target company.'09
In addition, advance notice requirements eliminate the
advantage of secrecy and speed-major factors in a successful
tender offer. 10 During this waiting period, management has at
its disposal various defensive tactics to defeat the takeover
such as merging with a friendly corporation, obtaining alterna-
tive tender offers, and repurchasing its own shares."' The wait-
ing period combined with the available defense tactics increase
the likelihood of failure of the offer and may have an adverse
effect on the stock market. The New York Stock Exchange has
objected"' to the delays occasioned by the waiting period stat-
ing:
During the twenty-day period, there could be rumors,
counter-offers and rumors of counter-offers which may re-
sult in price fluctuations to the extent that the market in
the stock would be disrupted. This may make it necessary
for the Exchange to temporarily halt trading in the stock.
In some cases, trading may be halted for the duration of
the twenty-day period."'
Administrative hearing requirements. Most state statutes
provide that the state securities commission may hold hearings
on its own motion"' or on the motion of the target company."'
In these states, the target company may extend the waiting
period by merely demanding a hearing. Ohio"6 and Virginia"7
require the hearing to be held within forty days of the filing,
and Ohio further requires completion of the hearing within
107. S. 2731, 89th Cong., ist Sess., § 10(e) in 111 CONG. REC. 28259 (1965).
108. See notes 47-49 and accompanying text supra.
109. See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
110. See Vorys, supra note 9, at 68.
111. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
112. See 1 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 1, at 11 (June 4, 1969).
113. Id. at A-12.
114. HAW. REv. STAT. § 417E-3(f) (1976).
115. E.g., S.D. COMPILED LAW ANN. § 47-32-23 (Supp. 1977). In these states the
target company can extend the waiting period by demanding a hearing no matter how
frivolous its objections are.
116. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(B)(4) (Page 1978).
117. VA. CODE § 13.1-534(b) (1978).
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sixty days. Massachusetts"' requires the hearing to be initiated
within sixty days and completed within ninety days after filing.
Thus, the tender offer may be delayed for a period of ninety
days after publication of the offer.
The hearings are designed to determine whether the offeror
has made a "full and fair disclosure." Whether that standard
is met is within the judgment of the corporations commis-
sioner."' Seven states allow the state commissioner to deter-
mine whether the offer itself is "fair and equitable." A share-
holder's decision to take advantage of a tender offer may be
blocked by the decision of a state official with whom the share-
holder has little or no connection.'20 The disclosure require-
ments, pre-filing notices, and administrative hearings may
delay a tender offer thereby causing its failure.
Other substantive provisions. In large measure the state
statutes follow federal regulation, although each of the states
has added a few new wrinkles of its own. The Williams Act
requires the offeror to make pro rata purchases of all shares
tendered within the first ten days.' A majority of the states
follow this pro rata requirement, but others have varied the
time periods from ten days as in Nevada 22 and Virginia' to
the full period of the offer as in Connecticut.' 4 All states fol-
low the Williams Act requirement that the offeror pay the
increased price to all tendered shares when a price change
occurs.'25 Section 14(d)(5) of the Williams Act provides the
shareholder with the right to withdraw his shares within the
first seven days of the offer and sixty days after the date of the
publication of the offer. Most state statutes provide for this
right to withdraw tendered shares, although the time allowed
may vary.' 6
118. MASS. GEN. LAW ch. 110C, § 6 (Supp. 1979).
119. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 119.01.13 (Page 1978) establishes the prerequisites
for hearings, such as notice (§ 119.07) and internal procedure (§ 119.09).
120. Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, Minnesota, South Dakota, Tennessee, and
Wisconsin. HAW. REv. STAT. § 417E-3(g) (1976); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-3-2(f) (1978);
LA. REv. STAT. § 51:1501; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80B.03(5) (West Supp. 1979); S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 47-32-27 (Supp. 1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-2104(5) (Cum.
Supp. 1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 552.05(5) (West Spec. Pamph. 1978).
Furthermore, in the only published decision interpreting "fair and equitable," the
Wisconsin Securities Commission has held that the adequacy of the price offered is to
be tested in the market and not in a hearing. In re EZ Painter Corp. & Newell Cos.,
(1976) 3 BLUE-SKY L. REP. (CCH) § 71.063, at 67,318 (Jan. 30, 1973).
121. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1976).
122. NEv. REV. STAT. § 78.3771(3) (1973).
123. VA. CODE § 13.1-530(c) (1978).
124. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-347h(c) (West 1978).
125. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1976).
126. Idaho, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and other states have followed the Wil-
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Massachusetts and Michigan require the offer to remain
open for a least sixty days.'27 Nevada and Virginia require the
offer to stay open at least twenty-one days and not more than
thirty-five days from the date of the offer. ' The Williams Act
contains no similar provisions, but section 14(d)(6) 29 has been
interpreted so as to require the offeror to continue its offer for
at least ten days if the offer is for less than all the outstanding
shares. I'
The anti-fraud, enforcement, and remedy provisions of the
state enactments are similar to those of the Williams Act.' 1
These similarities of the substantive provisions to the federal
scheme illuminate the fact that the real effect of the state
takeover statutes are in the jurisdiction, disclosure time period,
and administrative requirements.
Effects of the State Legislation
A major effect of state takeover statutes lies in their extra-
territorial application to shareholders in other states. For ex-
ample, under the Ohio Act, an offer made in New York to a
New York shareholder of an Ohio corporation comes within the
Ohio statute. 132 Consequently, state takeover legislation may
extend jurisdiction to all shareholders wherever located.
Additional disclosure requirements may discourage essen-
liams Act, while Nevada and Virginia provide the shareholders with.the opportunity
to withdraw their shares any time within 21 days from the date of the offer. IDAHO CODE
§ 30-1506(2) (Supp. 1978); MD. CORP. & ASS'NS. CODE ANN. § 11-905(b) (Cum. Supp.
1978); P.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 77(b) (Purdon Supp. 1978-79); NEv. REv. STAT. §
78.3772(2) (1973); VA. CODE § 13.1-530(b) (1978). Indiana provides for withdrawal until
three days prior to the expiration of the offer. IND. CODE § 23-3-3-5(a) (1976). Delaware
provides withdrawal rights at any time during the offer. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 203(a)(2)
(Cum. Supp. 1977).
127. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 110C, § 7 (Supp. 1979); MICH. STAT. ANN. §
21.293(5) (Supp. 1978).
128. NEv. REv. STAT. § 78.3772(1) (1973); VA. CODE § 13.1-530(a) (1978).
129. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1976).
130. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 303 F. Supp. 1354, 1359
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
131. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). Most state statutes give the state regulating
commission power to seek injunctive relief, and others empower the target company
to seek an injunction as well. E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 417E-8 (1976); IND. CODE § 23-
2-3-8(b) (1976). The remedies available to aggrieved shareholders consist of recission
or damages upon proof of fraudulent activities by the offeror. E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. §
552.21(1) (West Spec. Pamph. 1978). Furthermore, most state statutes provide for joint
and several liability. Idaho makes controlling persons of the offeror, broker-dealers,
partners, principal executive officers, and employees, if they materially aided in the
transaction, liable to the same extent as the offeror. IDAHO CODE § 30-1511(2) (Cum.
Supp. 1978).
132. See Commerce Clause, supra note 1, at 1150.
[Vol. 19
STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES
tial parties from participating in the offer.' 33 For example, a
bank whose identity may be disclosed as a source of funds may
be hesitant to advance credit for fear of being identified with
any drawn out litigation. A participating broker-dealer may be
unwilling to risk liability as a participant in an "illegal offer."
An arbitrageur may not be willing to participate if the threat
of delay creates the possibility of failure.' 34 One commentator
has stated:
Careful analysis of the Ohio Act would suggest that it is
"special interest" legislation sailing under different colors,
weighted obviously to protect incumbent management
from attack. This is accomplished largely under the fiction
of requiring fair disclosure to shareholders. This disclosure
method, however, is of such a nature, and the procedures
are so designed that they accomplish a substantive result
not encompassed in the expressed purpose of the legisla-
tion-the discouragement, nay, the prohibition in effect, of
tender offers. Disclosure is not the real aim. The real aim
is the protection of incumbent management from intrud-
ers.13
The delays occasioned by the disclosure, advance notice,
and administrative hearing requirements destroy the essential
secrecy and speed of a tender offer.'3 The additional uncertain-
ties and risks of exposure have made the tender offer no more
attractive than the proxy battle, the struggle the tender offer
was designed to replace.'37 The practical effect of state take-
over statutes may be to cause target companies to migrate to
those states offering such protection, in turn, causing more
states to enact takeover statutes in self defense.3 8
133. See Langevoort, supra note 8, at 239. See also ARANOW & EINHORN, supra
note 1, at 173-74.
134. See Langevoort, supra note 8, at 239.
135. Sommer, The Ohio Takeover Act: What Is It?, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 681,
720 (1970); see also Vorys, supra note 9, at 73.
136. See Vorys, supra note 9, 68.
137. See generally E. ARANOw & H. EINHORN, PROXY CONTEST FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL (2d ed. 1968).
For the advantages of cash tender offers, see D. AusTIN & J. FISHMAN, CORPORA-
TIONS IN CONFLICT-THE TENDER OFFER 8-9, 110-12 (1970); Bromberg, supra note 1, at
621-22; Note, Cash Tender Offers, 83 HARV. L. REv. 377, 378-79 (1969). The takeover
by proxy contest is a rarely used method of acquisition today. This is in part due to
the difficulty and expense involved in mounting a proxy battle and to the great advan-
tage of incumbent management in such a contest. See E. ARANOw & H. EINHORN,
PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 9-13 (2d ed. 1968); D. AUSTIN & J. FISHMAN,
supra, at 8-9. See also Brundney, A Note on Chilling Tender Solicitation, 21 RUTGERS
L. REv. 609, 620-24 (1967).
138. See Langevoort, supra note 8, at 239.
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State takeover statutes represent an impermissible at-
tempt to cloak essentially chauvinistic economic concerns with
the mantle of seemingly investor-oriented tender offer regula-
tions. These statutes impose substantial and unequal burdens
never contemplated by the Williams Act. Moreover, the funda-
mental provisons of the statutes-pre-filing notice and lengthy
waiting periods-were expressly rejected by Congress. Because
of this sharp divergence between the state and federal regula-
tory schemes, the inquiries essential to a challenge of the state
takeover statutes are: 1) whether they violate the commerce
clause of the United States Constitution and 2) whether the
Williams Act has preempted the field.
VIOLATION OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
Article I section 8 of the United States Constitution gives
Congress the power "to regulate commerce . . . among the
several states . . . ."I This was added "in order to prevent
unjustifiable local interference with the commercial inter-
course among the states."'40 The commerce clause is a major
source of national power as well as a major source of conflict
with state power. While the Constitution vests in Congress the
power to regulate commerce among the states, it does not give
adequate guidance to the states as to their permissible intru-
sion upon interstate commerce. The United States Supreme
Court, in H.P. Hood & Son v. DuMond, "I focused on this prob-
lem, pointing out that the states may shelter their people from
menaces to health and safety and fraud, but that they lack the
power to retard, burden, or constrict the flow of commerce for
their economic advantage. The Court stated:
This Court consistently has rebuffed attempts of states to
advance their own commercial interests by curtailing the
movement of articles of commerce, either into or out of the
state, while generally supporting their right to impose even
burdensome regulations in the interest of local health and
safety .... 142
The basic test of the validity of a state statute under the
commerce clause was set out by the United States Supreme
139. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
140. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 760
(1967); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
141. 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
142. Id. at 535-39.
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Court in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,' in which the Court
struck down an Arizona regulation barring the shipment of
uncrated local cantaloupes out of the state. The Court stated:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits."'
Thus, in order to be valid, a state statute must: 1) effectuate a
legitimate local interest; 2) affect interstate commerce only
incidentally; and 3) not excessively burden interstate com-
merce in relationship to the alleged local benefits provided.
Analysis of the state takeover statutes against this test demon-
strates their invalidity.
Legitimate Local Interest
Several state interests have been attributed to state take-
over statutes. The most common is the protection of sharehold-
ers of corporations incorporated in, or having significant
connections with, the state."' This interest is based primarily
upon the rights of the states under their "blue sky laws" to
protect their citizens from fraudulent securities transactions.'
If traditional blue sky laws are followed," 7 jurisdiction is lim-
ited to offers or sale of securities made within the state, and the
effect of state takeover statutes would be minimal.' However,
state takeover statutes have radically departed from tradi-
tional blue sky laws effecting shareholders outside the state
boundaries. For example, in Sparton Corp. v. Ward,"' a New
York corporation made an offer outside Ohio for securities of
an Ohio corporation prior to the expiration of the statutory
waiting period. The offer provided that it would. not become
effective as to Ohio residents until the expiration of the waiting
143. 397 U.S. 137,142 (1970).
144. Id. at 142.
145. Shipman, supra note 1, at 740.
146. L. Loss & W. Cowsrr, BLUE SKY LAWS 73 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Loss
& CoWETI.
147. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 557-59 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux
Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559, 563-68 (1917); Merrick v. N.M. Halsey & Co., 242
U.S. 568, 587 (1917).
148. See Aranow & Einhorn, State Securities Regulation of Tender Offers, 46
N.Y.U.L. REv. 767, 772-73 (1971).
149. No. 243,230 (C.P. Ct. Franklin City, Ohio, Jan. 8, 1971) (discussed in
ARamow & ENHoRN, supra note 1, at 172-73).
19791
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
period. Under the blue sky laws, a state regulates all tender
offers to its residents, and the offeror in Sparton simply
planned to avoid soliciting in that state. Shareholders in that
state who wished to participate in the offer would be able to
tender their shares on the open market. The only effect of the
state blue sky laws would be to deny local shareholders the full
premium price. 5 '
The target company in Sparton sued the Commissioner of
the Ohio Division of Securities, alleging violations of the Ohio
takeover statute and requesting the district court to issue tem-
porary restraining orders and injunctions compelling recission
of the offer.' The court found that the offer raised substantial
questions under the Ohio statutes, and ordered the Commis-
sioner to hold hearings on the matter. All other requested relief
was denied.'52 On appeal,' the target company's motion for a
temporary injunction was granted pending final disposition of
the matter. Shortly thereafter, the offer was withdrawn.
Such an aggressive assertion of legislative jurisdiction is
inconsistent with the professed purpose of the takeover
statutes -investor protection. Jurisdiction over the tender
offer often depends on the contacts of the target corporation
with the state, not the involvement of resident investors. In
addition, if blue sky laws are being used for jurisdictional pur-
poses, other states can protect their own citizens against fraud-
ulent security transactions without having to rely on Ohio's or
any other state's takeover provisions.'54
150. In addition to the spread between the market price and the tender price,
the sale of shares in the open market requires payment of brokerage commissions and
possibly transfer taxes, further reducing the net proceeds of sale. Brokerage commis-
sions and transfer taxes, if any, are normally borne by the offeror when shares are sold
pursuant to the tender offer.
151. See Wall St. J., Dec. 16, 1970, at 27, col. 5. The offer provided in part as
follows:
This Offer is not being made to, nor will tenders be accepted from,
stockholders residing in Ohio until such time the Offer may be made to
residents of Ohio in accordance with the Law of Ohio. Information has
been filed with the Ohio Securities Division in compliance with that law.
This Offer will become effective as to Ohio residents at 10:00 A.M.,
Eastern Standard Time, Monday, January 4, 1971, unless delayed by
reasons of appropriate action by the Ohio Securities Division, and will
remain effective until 5:00 P.M., Eastern Standard time, Friday, January
15, 1971, unless extended upon notice to the Depositary.
152. Sparton Corp. v. Ward, No. 243,230 (C.P. Ct., Franklin City., Ohio, Jan.
8, 1971).
153. Spartan Corp. v. Ward, No. 71-8 (Ct. App., Franklin City., Ohio, Jan. 12,
1971).
154. Commerce Clause, supra note 1, at 1153.
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A second local interest mentioned justify takeover statutes
is the state's legitimate interest in regulating the internal af-
fairs of corporations formed within the state.55 This internal
affairs doctrine permits a state to control "the relationship
inter sese of the corporation, its directors, officers, and stock-
holders," 56 and properly regulate such issues as shareholder
liability, validity of stock issues, mergers, voting agreements,
election of directors, relative rights and duties of officers, direc-
tors, shareholders, and issuing of dividends. "7 Basically, the
internal affairs doctrine applies to existing intracorporate rela-
tionships. "'
The argument that the internal affairs doctrine legitimizes
state regulation of tender offers for corporations incorporated
within the state is not sound. The doctrine applies to existing
intracorporate relationships and not to future relationships.
The crucial distinction between the internal affairs of the cor-
poration and the tender offer is that in the first instance the
relationship between the corporation and shareholder is al-
ready formed, whereas in the tender offer situation the rela-
tionship is not yet formed. Thus, the internal affairs doctrine
cannot logically apply.'59
One proponent of the global reach of the Ohio takeover
statute acknowledges that takeover bids do not actually in-
volve transactions that are purely internal corporate matters,
but instead finds such offers sufficiently analogous to certain
corporate acts that jurisdiction over them is justified.'" He
relies on the similarities of the proxy solicitation to tender of-
fers, stating that since both are used to acquire control, state
regulation is in order.'' Although the transfer of control is the
goal of both the tender offer and proxy solicitation, it is accom-
plished in two different contexts. "' In the tender offer situa-
tion, there may be a total transfer of ownership, whereas in a
proxy solicitation only the right to vote is transferred. There-
fore, the internal affairs doctrine supporting state regulation is
not sound.
155. Shipman, supra note 1, at 741.
156. Reese & Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice of Law
and the Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 COLUM. L. Rav. 1118, 1124 (1958).
157. Shipman, supra note 1, at 742.
158. Commerce Clause, supra note 1, at 1154.
159. Id.
160. Shipman, supra note 1, at 745.
161. Id. at 745.
162. Id. at 743-44.
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A third state interest offered to support tender offer legis-
lation is the "parochial attempt to protect incumbent manage-
ment and local industry,"' which surfaces when the legislative
declarations of investor protection are ignored and the practi-
cal operation of the statutes investigated.'
A number of states feared that established local companies
might, through the tender offer, be taken over by outside inter-
ests who would then close down plants and leave local residents
jobless." 5 For example in Ohio, Northwest Industries Inc.
began what turned into a hotly contested battle for the Ohio
based B. F. Goodrich & Co.' After successfully defeating the
offer, B.F. Goodrich joined with the Ohio Manufacturers Asso-
ciation to draft state legislation which would delay or block
takeovers of corporations located in Ohio.
State legislation that has as its goal the promotion of em-
ployment opportunities is clearly a legitimate local interest.
This point may be strengthened by analogy with favorable cor-
poration laws that attract industry to a state.117 However, the
United States Supreme Court has held that to benefit the busi-
ness or economic life of the state, at the expense of the other
states, does not supply an acceptable purpose. In Pike v. Bruce
Church Inc.,' the Court stated:
[T]he Court has viewed with particular suspicion state
statutes requiring business operations to be performed in
163. ARANow & EINHORN, supra note 1, at 172; Vorys, supra note 9, at 66.
164. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 144-45 (1970); Foster-
Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10 (1928).
165. The bills were not academic exercises in the legislative process. In Pennsyl-
vania, attempted takeovers of Sharon Steel Corp., Piper Aircraft Corp., and Westing-
house Air Brake Co. may have influenced the legislature to consider a bill requiring
an offeror for shares of a company incorporated in Pennsylvania, or having its principal
office in the state, to obtain approval of either the target's directors, the majority of
its shareholders, or the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Pa. H.B. 841
(1969 Sess.). See Metz, Market Place: States Defiant on Take-Overs, N.Y. Times,
June 3, 1969, at 62, col. 7.
In Illinois, a bill patterned after the Pennsylvania bill was the apparent response
to Ling-Tempco-Vought's acquisition of Wilson & Co., and General Host's takeover of
Armour & Co. The bill, however, was eventually defeated. See SEc. REG. & L. RzP.
(BNA) No. 5, at A-9 (July 2, 1969).
In Ohio, Northwest Industries, Inc. attempted to takeover Ohio-based B.F. Good-
rich & Co.. One commentator, who played a major role in the legislation, remarked
that as far as Ohio corporations are concerned, under the new law "the corporate
takeover as a form of corporate warfare is a thing of the past; acquisitions will hereafter
be negotiated." See SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 23, at A-3, A-4 (Nov. 5, 1969).
166. See SEc. REG. & L. RP. (BNA) No. 23, at A-3, A-6 (Nov. 5, 1969).
167. Tender Trap, supra note 8, at 19.
168. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
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the home state that could more efficiently be performed
elsewhere. Even where the state is pursuing a clearly legiti-
mate local interest, this particular burden on commerce
has been declared to be virtually per se illegal.'"
It has been argued that under the Pike rational, state take-
over statutes, having as their real purpose the protection of
management and local industry, are per se illegal.7 0 Where
states insulate local management through the regulation of
tender offers they are conferring on them the advantage of
protection from attack by out-of-state competitors. This type
of advantage it is argued, was forbidden by Pike.
Unlike the Pike statutes which served only one pur-
pose-requiring business operations to be performed in the
home state-state takeover statutes serve multiple ends. The
states, in choosing between the competing interests, have sided
with the target company. This choice may have been one-sided
and parochial; nevertheless, it probably serves a legitimate,
though tenuous, state purpose. Assuming that, the takeover
statutes must be analyzed under the second test in Pike;
whether they effect interstate commerce only incidentally.
Effect on Interstate Commerce
Ever since Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens,"' it has been
recognized that there are matters of local concern that may
never be fully dealt with by Congress. Therefore, notwithstand-
ing the commerce clause, if the interest is local in nature and
the effect on interstate commerce is minimal, the statute will
be upheld. Two seminal cases offer some guidance.
In Parker v. Brown, 72 a California raisin producer attacked
a marketing scheme established pursuant to the state Agricul-
ture Prorate Act. The law compelled each producer to put
most of his raisin crop under the marketing control of a pro-
gram committee in order to eliminate price competition among
producers. The United States Supreme Court noted that al-
though ninety-five percent of the crop was marketed in inter-
state commerce-having a substantial effect on com-
merce-such regulations by the state are to be sustained, not
because their effect is indirect rather than direct but because
the matter is of local concern and may never be adequately
169. Id. at 145.
170. Commerce Clause, supra note 1, at 1159.
171. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
172. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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dealt with by Congress.'
In Huron-Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,'74 the
United States Supreme Court upheld a city anti-pollution ordi-
nance applied to shipping traffic on the Great Lakes. Noting
that pollution was an acute local concern, the Court disposed
of the commerce clause objection summarily by stating:
The claim that the Detroit ordinance, quite apart from the
effect of federal legislation, imposes as to the appellant's
ship an undue burden on interstate commerce needed no
extended discussion. State regulations, based on police
power, which do not discriminate against interstate com-
merce or operate to disrupt its required uniformity, may
constitutionally stand.76
In upholding the validity of the state regulation, the Court
in both cases relied upon the fact that the issues involved mat-
ters of local concern which Congress had not attempted to regu-
late. Tender offers, in contrast, are of national concern, and
Congress has expressly regulated in the area by passage of the
Williams Act. Additionally the state takeover laws which have
tremendous extraterritorial reach have gone far beyond local
concerns. They deny the citizens of other states the power to
choose their own way of regulating tender offers. They may
affect a remote shareholder. Further, the action taken by one
state in respect to a tender offer may disrupt trading and the
orderly regulation of the national securities market.7 '
One commentator has argued that, although state
regulation of securities through state blue sky laws have with-
stood constitutional objection in the past, they should be made
uniform or be abolished. "' As the scope of interstate commerce
has widened, it has become increasingly difficult to claim that
any activity, particularly a security transaction, is wholly in-
trastate and within the exclusive province of the states. What-
ever the arguments for restricting blue sky laws, they should
apply with even greater force to state takeover statutes that
present a far greater threat to interstate commerce.
173. Id. at 362-63.
174. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
175. Id. at 448.
176. See New York Stock Exchange review of the Ohio statute in SEC.. aG.&
L. REP. (BNA) No. 1, at A-11 (June 4, 1969).
177. See Tender Trap, supra note 8, at 20. See also L. Loss, SEcURITIEs
REGULATION 102-03 (.2d ed. 1961); Loss & Cowar, supra note 146, at 170; Bateman,
State Securities Registration: An Unresolved Dilemma And A Suggestion For The
Federal Securities Code, 27 Sw. L.J. 759 (1973).
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Even if state takeover statutes provide a legitimate state
interest and affect interstate commerce, they must satisfy the
third criterion set forth in Pike:'78 whether the burden imposed
on interstate commerce is excessive in relationship to the al-
leged local benefits provided by the statute and whether there
is a less intrusive alternative.
Excessive Burden on Interstate Commerce
It has generally been recognized that in the absence of
conflicting legislation by Congress, there is a residuum of power
in the states to make laws governing local concerns.' However,
even where the nature of the interest is local, states have not
been given the authority to restrict commerce or to regulate
those areas which require uniformity. 18
In Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,'8' the United States
Supreme Court struck down an Arizona law regulating the
length of trains that could operate within its borders. The
practical effect of such regulation was to control train opera-
tions beyond its borders by requiring the breaking up and reas-
sembling of trains at the nearest terminal points before enter-
ing and leaving Arizona. Therefore, there was an excessive bur-
den placed upon interstate commerce, as well as the prospect
that each state might mandate different train lengths.
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines Inc.'82 involved a conflict
among the states over an Illinois statute requiring the use of
rear fender mudguards on trucks operating on Illinois state
highways. The Supreme Court invalidated the statute, con-
cluding that, although the power of the state to regulate the use
of its highways is broad and pervasive, the heavy burden which
the law placed upon the interstate movement of trucks ex-
ceeded the permissible limits even for a safety regulation.'8
In comparing the situations involved in Southern Pacific
and Bibb to tender offers, state takeover statutes that regulate
tender offers outside their borders place too onerous a burden
on interstate commerce. The extraterritorial reach of one
state's tender offer legislation may deny citizens of another
state the ability to participate in an offer by requiring the
178. 397 U.S. at 142.
179. Id.
180. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
181. Id. at 761.
182. 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
183. Id. at 529-30.
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offeror to follow its extensive pre-filing disclosure requirements
and hearing procedures to the point that the offer fails due to
delay.'8 ' Furthermore, such delay may cause price fluctuation'85
and uncertainty'80 in the national security exchanges. The dif-
fering state regulations compound the problems the SEC may
have in controlling the national market.'8 These burdens im-
posed by state takeover statutes substantially exclude consid-
eration of any alleged local benefits the statutes might engen-
der. In particular, the possibility of increasing the value of the
stock after the announcement of the offer,' 8 and the disclosure
requirements enabling the stockholder to make a more com-
plete investment decision'8" are very uncertain. Consequently,
the burdens imposed on interstate commerce by state takeover
statutes go far beyond the threshold permitted under com-
merce clause analysis. Although it may be argued that the
effect of one state takeover statute might be minimal, thirty-
six states'90 have passed such legislation. With each asserting
jurisdiction, the conflicting results, along with the delays in-
curred, may render the tender offer useless as an effective tool
for acquiring control and removing ineffective management." '
Traditional commerce clause analysis involves a consider-
ation of whether a legitimate local interest exists, and whether
the burden imposed on interstate commerce is excessive in
relationship to the putative local benefit."'2 However, in Pike
184. For example, Delaware requires an offer to be made to the public not less
than 20 days nor more than 60 days after the offer. If an offer is made for shares of a
Delaware corporation with substantial assets in Ohio, the possible delay caused by the
hearing may delay the effective date beyond the period permitted by Delaware law.
See DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 203(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977). For a good example, see Great
Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977), aff'd, 577 F.2d
1256 (5th Cir.), hearing granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3463 (1978).
185. SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 1, at A-12 (June 4,1969).
186. See ARANOW & EINHORN, supra note 1, at 191, involving the function of the
arbitrageur and the effects of state takeover statutes have with this important func-
tion.
187. SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 1, at A-12 (June 4, 1969).
188. Bills Providing for Full Disclosure of Corporate Entity Ownership of Securi-
ties Under the Security Exchange Act of 1934: Hearings on H.R. 14475 & S. 510 Before
the Subcomm. on Commerce & Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign
Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1968) (remarks of Donald L. Calvin, Vice Presi-
dent of the New York Stock Exchange).
189. Immaterial disclosure when required by the state gives the target company
adequate time to defend against the takeover through various defense tactics. See
generally ARANOW & EINHORN, supra note 1, at 223-68.
190. See notes 8, 75 supra.
191. See Brundney, A Note on Chilling Tender Solicitations, 21 Ruops L. REv.
609, 624 (1967); Cohen, A Note on Takeover Bids and Corporate Purchase of Stock,
22 Bus. LAW. 149, 151-52 (1966).
192. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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the Court identified another possible criterion for determining
the permissible burden on commerce: whether the "local inter-
est involved .. could be promoted as well with a lesser im-
pact on interstate activities."' 3 The avowed purpose of the
state takeover statutes is to protect shareholders. This purpose
may be better implemented through the provisions of the Wil-
liams Act without imposing the burdens inherent in the state
takeover statutes.
In sum, although state takeover statutes supply a legiti-
mate but tenuous local interest, the burdens imposed on inter-
state commerce are clearly beyond the permissible limit,
thereby rendering them unconstitutional. In addition, there is
a less intrusive alternative-the Williams Act-which repre-
sents all interests and provides a uniform system of regulation.
PREEMPTION BY FEDERAL LAW
Even though the federal securities statutes specifically
eschew preemption, state legislation concerning tender offers
raises the question of whether federal regulation of tender offers
should be exclusive. Preemption, a judically developed theory,
is derived from the supremacy clause of the United States Con-
stitution, providing that the laws of the United States shall be
the "Supreme Law of the land."'' 4 Thus, under the supremacy
clause a state law is invalid when it conflicts directly with
federal law, making compliance with both impossible. In addi-
tion, a state law with a valid purpose consistent with federal
legislation may nevertheless be invalid where its effect is to
pose an "obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress.""
The traditional determination for preemption is whether
Congress intended, in passing federal legislation in an area, to
preempt state law."'
Where Congress has expressly declared that federal law
shall be exclusive, there is no doubt that states are precluded
from regulation of the activity."7 However, where Congress has
not expressly prohibited dual regulation nor expressly declared
193. Id. at 142.
194. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2.
195. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
196. The test was established in Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), and
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947), and reaffirmed by the Court in
City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
197. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1146 (8th Cir.
1971).
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its exclusionary exercise of authority, federal preemption may
still be implied.'98 This implied intent may be shown by: 1) a
Congressional scheme of regulation so pervasive that it is rea-
sonable to infer that Congress left no room for the states to
supplement it; 2) when the nature of the subject matter de-
mands exclusive federal regulation to achieve uniformity vital
to national interests; and 3) where state law is in conflict with
federal law so as to pose an obstacle to the accomplishments
of congressional objectives.' An examination of congressional
intent and the operation of the state takeover statutes shows
that the area should be preempted by federal law.
Expressed Intent
Congress has addressed itself to the preemption issue in
section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which
provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the
securities commission (or any agency or officer performing
like functions) of any State over any security or any person
insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this
chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder.2"
It has been contended that the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, by its own terms, negates any inference of preemption,
expressly "saving" all state legislation."' This proposition is
largely supported by the historical relationship between con-
current federal and state regulation of securities transactions .
20 2
The applicability of section 28 to tender offers is questionable,
for state laws regulating takeovers have radically departed
from state blue sky laws.20 3 The question is also raised whether
section 28 should be construed to apply to amendments, such
as the Williams Act, particularly since the state takeover stat-
utes may involve a type of jurisdiction not contemplated by
Congress. Where, as here, subsequent state legislation is not of
substantially the same character as those laws Congress in-
tended to save, traditional preemption analysis supplants the
198. Id.
199. 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
200. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976).
201. See Shipman, supra note 1, at 759-60.
202. See generally Smith, State "Blue Sky" Laws and the Federal Securities
Acts, 34 MICH. L. REv. 1135 (1936).
203. The most obvious departure from the traditional blue sky laws is found in
the extraterritorial impact of the statutes.
[Vol. 19
STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES
saving clause even if the clause might appear to protect the
state statute. 04 Since it is not expressly clear that Congress
intended to save state takeover statutes from preemption, it is
necessary to consider whether preemption is implied. The first
inquiry under that doctrine is whether the congressional
scheme of regulation under the Williams Act is so pervasive as
to leave no room for supplemental state legislation.0 5
Pervasive Federal Regulation
The principle that pervasive federal regulation will im-
pliedly preempt state legislative activity formed the basis of
the decision in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal
Inc. ,20 in which the United States Supreme Court struck down
a city curfew ordinance regulating air traffic and noise pollu-
tion at certain times of the day. Congressional intent to create
a comprehensive plan controlling air traffic and noise pollution
was shown. One commentator has cited Burbank as persuasive
authority for federal preemption of state takeover statutes by
the Williams Act. 20 7
The question of whether the Williams Act pervades the
field of tender offers is a difficult one for the courts.20 1 The
argument on one side is that the Williams Act, unlike the Noise
Control Act of 1972 involved in Burbank, is not a comprehen-
sive regulatory scheme, but concerns only a minimum disclo-
sure standard. 209 The opposite argument contends that the Wil-
liams Act combined with the federal securities acts provides
the necessary pervasive regulation to preempt state legisla-
tion.210 Accepting the latter argument's weakness, the second
determination under preemption analysis is whether there is a
dominant federal interest in national uniformity in the area of
tender offers .21
204. See Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F.
515, 540-41.
205. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
206. 411 U.S. 218 (1947).
207. See Commerce Clause, supra note 1, at 1163-64.
208. Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
The court held that the Williams Act was not a pervasive scheme preempting state
takeover statutes. This decision was affirmed on appeal, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978),
and is presently before the United States Supreme Court, 47 U.S.L.W. 3463 (1978)
(Docket No. 78-759).
209. See Shipman, supra note 1, at 759-60.
210. See Commerce Clause, supra note 1, at 1164.
211. 411 U.S. 624, 638-40 (1973).
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Dominant Federal Interest
. One major obstacle looms in the way of preemption and
the concomitant need for national uniformity. For forty years
concurrent jurisdiction has existed between state and federal
agencies in the field of securities regulation."' Such concurrent
jurisdiction was reaffirmed in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner,
and Smith, Inc. v. Ware'13 where the United States Supreme
Court held that New York Stock Exchange Rules calling for the
arbitration of any controversies arising out of the termination
of employment did not preempt wage relief available under
California law."' The Court determined that there was no need
for national uniformity under federal securities policy in the
area of wage claims, and more importantly, that Congress had
expressly provided that the stock exchange should be subject
to state regulation of the type involved.2 5 Indeed, Congress, in
the securities field, has not adopted a regulation system wholly
apart from and exclusive of state regulation. Given this tradi-
tional role of the states in the area of securities regulation, it
has been argued that the federal interest in tender offers cannot
be deemed so dominant that the area is one of exclusive federal
concern. 21
However, the tender offer situation is not a case in which
the contention is being made to federalize that which has tradi-
tionally been a matter of state law. On the contrary, federal
legislation existed prior to parochial state takeover laws. With
the sole exception of Virginia, all of the state takeover laws
were passed after the adoption of the Williams Act. t In this
regard, the cases2 18 relied on by the states to support coexist-
ence of state and federal regulation of tender offers are inappos-
ite because they involve laws which existed prior to the enact-
ment of federal securities legislation and governed transactions
strictly local in nature.
212. Concurrent jurisdiction was upheld in the securities field in: Hall v. Geiger-
Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 557-59 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242
U.S. 559, 567-68 (1917); Merrick v. N.M. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568, 590 (1917).
213. 414 U.S. 117 (1973).
214. Id. at 136.
215. Id. at 136-37.
216. Langevoort, supra note 8, at 247-48. See also Great Western United Corp.
v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977). The case was sustained on appeal, 577
F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), and is presently before the United States Supreme Court,
47 U.S.L.W. 3463 (1978)(Docket No. 78-759).
217. The Virginia takeover statute became effective March 5, 1968, while the
Williams Act became law on the 29th of July, 1968.
218. See note 212 supra.
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The Court in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal,
Inc.,'", discussed the need for uniformity concerning air traffic,
reasoning that if independent jurisdictions were able to pass
legislation controlling air traffic and noise pollution, the result
would be a severe limitation on the ability of federal agencies
to control congestion and confusion in air traffic. 20 Similarly,
if state takeover statutes in the area of tender offers are allowed
to stand, the result may cause serious difficulties for a corpora-
tion to complete an offer successfully. For example, a tender
offer for shares of a Delaware corporation with its principal
place of business in Ohio and substantial portions of its assets
in Ohio and Indiana, might be subjected to the takeover laws
of all three states. The hearing, which could be required in Ohio
and Indiana, could provide a delay that might conflict with
Delaware's requirement that the offer be made not less than
twenty nor more than sixty days after the delivery of a state-
ment of intent to make the offer. These potential problems may
be resolved in substance by reference to established choice of
law doctrines and, in any event, by cooperation among regula-
tory agencies. Nevertheless, the argument for uniform control
of tender offers has considerable force and lends support for
preemption.22 ' The national scope of our securities market and
the broad national ownership of publicly held companies com-
bine to make the federal interest in the regulation of tender
offers dominant.
Conflicting Federal and State Laws
The third test for implied preemption-whether state laws
conflict with the efficient administration of federal
laws-provides the most persuasive argument that the take-
over statutes should be preempted. Although simultaneous
compliance with the Williams Act and the various state stat-
utes is possible, the latter prevent the full accomplishment of
congressional purpose .222
The congressional purpose in adopting the Williams Act
was to insure a fair field of competition in connection with
contests for corporate control.122 The Williams Act, therefore,
reflects a careful balancing of the need for substantive regula-
219. 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
220. Id. at 638-39.
221. See Commerce Clause, supra note 1, at 1165-66.
222. 411 U.S. at 624.
223. See notes 45-47 and accompanying text supra.
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tion of tender offers with the desire to preclude unnecessary
restraints on the capacity of interested persons to make tender
offers. Unfortunately, state takeover statutes upset this care-
fully balanced process and impose burdens on the offeror that
either were expressly or implicitly rejected by Congress. 24
The additional disclosure required by the state statutes is
of questionable materiality to securities holders in making an
investment decision. Such additional disclosures can obscure
the necessary information contained in the tender offer, and,
if inaccurate, can provide incumbent management with an
unwarranted defense. 225 In addition, the disclosure require-
ments of the state laws are much more extensive for the of-
feror.2 21 This unequal regulation of the offeror and target com-
pany stands in sharp contrast to the regulation under the Wil-
liams Act. The waiting periods and the administrative hearings
provided by state laws run directly contrary to the Williams
Act, 27 as do other substantive provisions. 28
While Congress intended to balance the interests of all
parties by passage of the Williams Act, the state statutes bene-
fit the target company at the expense of the offeror.22 1 In sum,
state takeover statutes impose substantial and unequal bur-
dens on the offeror never contemplated by the Williams Act.
Moreover, the generic provisions of the state laws, pre-filing
notices, and lengthy waiting periods were expressly rejected by
Congress.
Proponents of the state statutes argue strongly that the
Williams Act established only minimum standards and stricter
state legislation does not require preemption. 20 They cite
224. For example, the advance disclosure and filing provisions would have pre-
vented persons from making cash tender offers or certain other acquisitions of securi-
ties until twenty days after filing information with the SEC. However, this was ex-
pressly rejected. 113 CoNG. REc. 854-57 (1967).
225. The institution of lawsuits charging faulty compliance with disclosure re-
quirements have become a popular defensive tactic by target companies, hopefully
buying additional time with which to defeat the offer. E. ARANOw, H. EINHORN & G.
BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 206 (1977).
226. Lack of specific regulation of the disclosure and dissemination of state-
ments made by the target company is a common feature of the state statutes. See, e.g.,
OHio Rv. CODE ANN. §§ 1707.041(A)-.041(I) (Page 1978); Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 292.560-
292.991 (Cum. Supp. 1978); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1600-1613 (McKinney Supp.
1978-79).
227. See notes 106-120 and accompanying text supra.
228. See notes 121-131 and accompanying text supra.
229. See FORBES, Feb. 1, 1976, at 24-25; see note 185 and accompanying text
supra. See also ARANOW & EINHORN, supra note 1, at 173-74, 184-85.
230. See Shipman, supra note 1, at 759-60.
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Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul3' as persuasive
authority for additional state regulation of tender offers. In
Florida Lime, the United States Supreme Court upheld a Cali-
fornia regulation governing the content of avocado oil sold
within the state. Federal regulation pursuant to the Agriculture
Adjustment Act gauged the maturity by a standard other than
oil content, and thus a conflict existed between the state and
federal agencies. The Court ruled that the supremacy clause
did not prohibit California from excluding Florida avocados
certified as mature under the federal regulations but contain-
ing less than minimum oil content for California. 32 The Court
concluded that "there is neither such actual conflict between
the two schemes of regulations that both cannot stand in the
same area, nor evidence of a congressional design to preempt
the field. '2 33 The Court reasoned that state regulation may
stand so long as dual compliance is possible, and no demon-
strated need for national uniformity exists. The Court held that
the stricter standard, although in actual conflict with federal
regulation, withstood the constitutional challenge, basing its
decision on "minimum" rather than "uniform" standards.
In response to the above analysis, a more recent case has
given added direction concerning the importance of national
versus local impact. In Jones v. Rath Packing Co.,1' the United
States Supreme Court found that California weight labeling
requirements on certain processed foods were in conflict with
federal law and thus preempted. Under the California regula-
tion, the only permissible variations from the stated weight
were those caused by unavoidable deviations in the manufac-
turing process, whereas the federal regulation permitted varia-
tion caused by distribution losses as well. Accordingly, pack-
ages complying with federal regulation risked state action for
noncompliance. Although it was possible to comply with the
state law without triggering federal enforcement, the Court felt
that the state law would impede a purpose of the federal regu-
lation, that of facilitating value comparisions by shoppers, and
therefore should be preempted.
The somewhat conflicting results reached by the Court in
Florida Lime and Jones may be reconciled. The distinguishing
fact involved the extraterritorial impact of the state statutes
231. 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
232. Id. at 145.
233. Id.
234. 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
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and the need for national uniformity. To the extent that state
takeover statutes supplement federal securities laws by filling
in the interstices in federal law, no objection should properly
be raised.25 But, as has been shown, the state statutes go far
beyond that to the point of frustrating the purpose of the Wil-
liams Act. Therefore, preemption analysis of state takeover
statutes cannot stop with the possibility of concurrent jurisdic-
tion, but must look to the immediate impact of the statutes on
other jurisdictions.
In Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota,3 the court
dealt with a state nuclear radiation safety regulation which was
stricter than regulations established by the Atomic Energy
Commission. In acknowledging that concurrent jurisdiction
was feasible, the court struck down the state regulation empha-
sizing that the plant was part of an interstate nuclear power
transmission system which made possible the purchase and
sale of electric power between major systems across the nation,
and concluded that only through the application and enforce-
ment of the uniform standards of a national agency would those
objectives be assured.237 The court, in strengthening its posi-
tion, stated:
Were the states allowed to impose stricter standards on the
level of radioactive waste releases discharged from nuclear
power plants, they might conceivably be so overprotective
in the area of health and safety as to unnecessarily stultify
the industrial development and use of atomic energy for
the production of electric power.23
Since national energy policy was directly affected by any at-
tempt to regulate nuclear safety standards, the court con-
cluded that the appropriate body to deal with such standards
235. It is beyond the scope of this comment to delineate with particularity the
areas in which the states properly could regulate tender offers. Nevertheless, assuming
the absence of any attempt to upset the balance between a tender offeror and the target
company, and assuming the existence of a jurisdictional prequisite not burdensome
on interstate commerce, it appears that the states may regulate tender offers:
- for non-public companies;
- that are wholly intrastate in nature;
- for Securities Exchange Act Section 15(d) companies which are not covered by
the Williams Act;
- insofar as tender offers are unduly burdened by internal corporate machina-
tions; and
- by proscribing fraud in connection with a tender offer by either the offeror or
the target company.
236. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971).




was an agency serving a national interest-the Atomic
Energy Commission.
A similar analysis of state takeover legislation leads to the
conclusion that the Williams Act is preemptive, and the SEC
is the appropriate body to deal with tender offers. Because of
the sharp divergence between the state and federal approaches,
there is no room for adherence to the requirements of both
regulatory schemes. Various conflicts will result if the state
statutes are allowed to stand. Unlike the securities market, the
challenged statute in Florida Lime involved local industry, was
enacted and administered by a local agency, and was not sup-
ported by a clear federal intent to regulate.
In considering the national scope of the securities market,
the broad national ownership of publicly held corporations,
and the extraterritorial coverage of state takeover statutes, the
need for uniform regulation of tender offers is evident. Congress
has set forth a statutory framework under the Williams Act in
which the tender offer may proceed. The Williams Act provides
uniformity, convenience, and certainty in regulating tender of-
fers, and assures that the offeror, management, and share-
holder interests will be protected. In disrupting this framework
through extensive disclosure requirements, pre-filing, and
hearing procedures, state takeover statutes have tipped the
balance in favor of the target company. This legislative imbal-
ance poses an "obstacle to the accomplishments and execution
of the full purpose and objectives of Congress""2 3 ' and should be
preempted.
A Federal Solution
Resolution of the conflicts reflected in the different ap-
proaches of the Williams Act and the state takeover statutes
could be dealt with at the federal level by judicial or legislative
action.
Judical resolution of these issues may be long in coming.
Obviously, the matter will not be laid to rest by the decision
of a single district court turning on the peculiarities of the state
statute involved.""0 Given time, the preemption and constitu-
239. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
240. The court in Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. 420 (N.D.
Tex. 1977), held that the Idaho takeover statute is unconstitutional, placing an undue
burden on interstate commerce, and is preempted under traditional prremption analy-
sis. The case was sustained on appeal, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), and is presently
before the Supreme Court of the United States, 47 U.S.L.W. 3463 (1978) (Docket No.
78-759).
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tional issues will be resolved. In the meantime, congressional
action should be taken to nullify state legislation concerning
tender offers.
Congressional action might take the course of total
preemption, expressly providing that "no state or political sub-
division thereof may adopt or enforce tender offers." '' This
approach is probably not politically feasible at this time, for
it would prohibit states from regulating even those bids not
subject to federal regulation. A more reasonable approach
would be for Congress to preempt state legislation when federal
law is applicable. This position has been adopted by the Ameri-
can Law Institute"' which stated:
(a) the state legislation tends to be pro-management in
contrast to the neutral tone of the Federal Provisions...;
(b) the application of state legislation to foreign corpora-
tions . . . introduces needless complexity in an area al-
ready regulated by Congress; and (c) it is just as well to
make this area exclusively federal before this sort of state
legislation spreads." 3
CONCLUSION
The two tiers of legislation which now exist have injected
considerable confusion into the tender offer area. While the
Williams Act was designed to create a balanced scheme of
regulation, state takeover statutes are anything but even-
handed. Some impose substantial and unequal burdens upon
tender offers never contemplated by the Williams Act. The
fundamental provisions of these statutes-pre-filing notifica-
tion, disclosure requirements, administrative hearings, and the
extraterritorial reach of the statutes-are in conflict with the
established purpose of the Williams Act. These statutes upset
the delicate balance of forces in tender offer contests, and con-
stitute a regressive and conflicting regulatory scheme.
Even though state takeover statutes serve a legitimate
though tenuous local interest, the burden imposed upon inter-
state commerce is too onerous. There are less intrusive means
of protecting investors, while allowing the offeror and manage-
ment an equal opportunity to fairly present their cases. There-
241. Commerce Clause, supra note 1, at 1173 (emphasis omitted).
242. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1603(c) (1) (Oct. 1974 Rptr.'s Revision of
Text of Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-3, 1974).
243. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1603, Comment 10 (Tent. Draft No. 3,
1974).
[Vol. 19
19791 STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES 429
fore, these statutes are unconstitutional under the commerce
clause.
In order to inject more certainty into the economic process,
of which the tender offer is a part, judical or congressional
action should be taken to preempt state takeover statutes, thus
restoring the balance of forces Congress deemed so essential to
the conduct of takeover contests.
Alan B. Ford

